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Abstract 
 
In 2004 the then president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki referred to a number of civil society 
organisations (more commonly known as non-profit organisations or NPOs) as “enemies of 
the ruling party” because they were publicly extremely critical of the ANC government’s 
neoliberal policies and development strategies (Mngxitama 2004). NPOs which work in 
collaboration with state agencies and act as conduits for delivering services were regarded as 
friends of the ruling party. This discourse has prevailed within the ANC until today. However, 
a third category of NPOs engages with the African National Congress (ANC) government. 
They sometimes characterise what Mbeki called enemies and at other times they behave as 
friends of the ANC government. One could call them “frienemies”.  
 
In this paper the discussion of NPOs is situated in the context of civil society’s relations with 
the state in a democratic South Africa. I briefly discuss the recent history of NPOs relations 
with the state. I then consider why NPOs that engage with the state find it easier to be either 
friends or enemies with the ANC government and why the government has so few 
“frienemies” – despite its recognition that their dual role is valuable for development.  I end 
the paper by briefly examining the Treatment Action Campaign and the Surplus People 
Project as examples of NPOs that have managed, successfully, to play the dual roles as 
“frienemies” of the ANC government. These examples illustrate ways in which some NPOs 
can manage to perform both roles, as well as the difficulties they experience in trying to 
balance these two roles. This paper is not suggesting that all NPOs ought to perform both 
roles, for that would deny the benefits that diversity among organs of civil society can bring, 
but it does draw attention to the advantages for development of some South African NPOs 
performing both these roles.   
                                                 
1
  This paper was presented in 2011 in the Faculty of Sociology’s Social Anthropology section at Bielefeld 
University. Sections of this paper are contained in a journal article by the author entitled “On the horns of a 
dilemma: Non-profit organizations relations with the state in post-apartheid South Africa, which was published 
in Africanus, Vol.40, No. 2, 2010.  
2
 The author is a tenured senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology’s Development Studies Programme at 
the University of Cape Town. He worked previously as a development practitioner and a human rights activist in 
the non-profit sector.   
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1. Introduction 
In 2004 the then president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki referred to a number of civil society 
organisations (more commonly known as non-profit organisations or NPOs) as enemies of the 
ruling party because they were publicly extremely critical of the ANC government’s 
neoliberal policies and development strategies (Mngxitama 2004). NPOs which work in 
partnership with state agencies and act as conduits for delivering services were regarded as 
friends of the ruling party. These organisations, mostly well-established NGOs received 85% 
of the government funds allocated to the non-profit sector (see Swilling and Russell 2002, 34-
35). According to Habib (2005) NPOs are currently divided into two camps: those that play 
the role of social watchdog, and apolitical delivers of services. This discourse has prevailed 
within the ANC until today. However, NPOs relations with the state in a democratic South 
Africa are more complex. A third category of NPOs engages with the ANC government. 
 
Working with Mbeki’s discourse there are NPOs that sometimes characterise what he calls 
enemies and at other times they behave as friends of the ANC government. One could call 
them “frienemies”.  
 
This is more than an analytical category. As a matter of fact Dr Skweyiya, who was minister 
of Social Development until May 2009, stated early in the 2000s that the government 
expected NPOs to perform dual roles (Barnard and Terreblanch 2001, 17). The first is as a 
partner assisting the government with service delivery and the second is as a watchdog of the 
government’s public policy priorities and practices.  
 
Is the government’s acknowledgement that NPOs need to perform both roles largely rhetoric? 
Can the ANC tolerate this ambiguity? A number of factors, in particular, the political 
environment, make it difficult for NPOs to be critical of the ANC government’s public policy 
priorities and practices, and yet collaborate with the state. Will NPOs have to sacrifice their 
role as watchdog if they wish to participate in service delivery?  
 
In this paper the discussion of NPOs is situated in the context of civil society’s relations with 
the state in a democratic South Africa. I briefly discuss the history of NPOs relations with the 
state. I then consider why NPOs that engage with the state find it easier to be either friends or 
enemies with the ANC government and why it has so few “frienemies” – despite its 
recognition that their dual role is valuable for development.  I end the paper by briefly 
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examining the Treatment Action Campaign and the Surplus People Project as examples of 
NPOs that have managed, successfully, to play the dual roles. These examples illustrate ways 
in which some NPOs can manage to perform both roles, as well as the difficulties they 
experience in trying to balance these two roles. This paper is not suggesting that all NPOs 
ought to perform both roles, for that would deny the benefits that diversity among organs of 
civil society can bring, but it does draw attention to the advantages for development of some 
South African NPOs performing both these roles.   
 
2. Concepts: Non-profit organisation and civil society  
According to Swilling and Russell (2002), an organisation qualifies as an NPO if it has the 
following characteristics: 
i) Organised: It reflects the relative persistence of goals, structures and activities and 
excludes ad hoc groups.  
ii) Private: It excludes state structures and can receive financial support from government 
and contract with government.  
iii) Self-governing: It must control its own activities, (i.e. it is not controlled by outside 
parties like government or profit-making businesses.  
iv) Voluntary: It is a voluntary association with non-compulsory contributions and 
membership, and it must solicit the services of volunteers in its operational management. 
v) Non-profit distributing: Its primary purpose is not profit-making. Any profits are 
ploughed back into the organisation to further its mission, and are not shared among 
directors or owners. 
 
NPOs are organs of civil society, but what is civil society? Often those who favour a strong 
civil society adopt an anti-statist perspective: the state and civil society are two distinct 
spheres. Atkinson (1996, 288) describes “anti-statism” as “disillusionment with parliamentary 
democracy, the welfare state, and the alienation engendered by vast government 
bureaucracies”. Although anti-statism may well describe the position of some civil society 
groups, it does not reflect post-1994 relations between the state and civil society in South 
Africa. I am looking for a definition that reflects the mixture of collegial and antagonistic 
relations between NPOs and the state.   
A working definition, inspired by Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, has proved useful. 
“Gramsci, unlike Marx, did not make a radical separation between the state and civil society” 
(Pillay 1996, 340). He recognised that the state plays a necessary role in developing civil 
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society, yet argued against the conflation of the two (ibid). This definition acknowledges the 
difficulty in setting hard and fast boundaries between the various spheres of society. Civil 
society can, therefore, be seen to constitute the area between the state apparatus and 
individuals or families. It includes elements of the economy, such as business associations, 
but the economic base of society constitutes a separate realm (ibid). It excludes the formal 
political society, which is made up of political parties in parliament, but includes social 
movements that lobby to change public policy. It constitutes a wide range of voluntary non-
profit organisations, such as business associations, civics, community-based organisations 
(CBOs), social movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and religious groups. 
The diagram in Fig.1 below shows how the different spheres of society overlap, which, in my 
view, better represents the relations between the various spheres of contemporary South 
African society than unmitigated anti-statism does. It also accommodates the diverse types of 
relationships between civil society and the state: some organs of civil society collaborate with 
the state, while others oppose it; some may collaborate at times, and oppose at others. The 
ambiguity is to be expected, but can it be tolerated in a new democratic South Africa?  
Fig.1: Civil society and the democratic state (Pillay 1996, 341) 
  
The roles of NPOs as organs of civil society and their relationship to the state in post-
apartheid South Africa are subject to much current debate. In order to understand the debate I 
need briefly to locate the NPO-state relationships in an historical context.  
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3. NPOs’ relations with the state from 1994 
With the transition to democracy in 1994 a “freedom and consultation era” (1994-1996) in 
NPO-state relations was ushered in (Nauta 2004, 16). Progressive leaders entered legitimate 
politics for the first time, and one of the consequences was the setting up of working relations 
and collaboration between government departments and civil society. For the first time in the 
history of South Africa the government was viewed by civil society as the main driver of 
service delivery to poor communities. In the years 1994-1996 the ANC’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) provided a framework for development and transformation. 
The RDP provided civil society with a place in redistributive growth and people-centred 
development (Swilling & Russell 2002, 4 & African National Congress 1994,131). During 
this period RDP Forums were established around the country. The RDP Forums brought 
government, NPOs and poor communities together in order to identify and address socio-
economic problems. The political agenda of anti-apartheid orientated NPOs had been 
achieved with the end of the liberation struggle and the election of a democratic government. 
In a democratic South Africa NPOs were expected to trade-in their “culture of resistance” for 
a “culture of development” (Fitzgerald 1992, 22) in collaboration with the ANC-led 
government.  
 
The ANC government encouraged foreign aid agencies to channel donor funds through the 
state. Consequently, a large percentage of international funding that previously had gone 
directly to NPOs was now channelled through the new government (Atkinson 1996, 295; 
Kraak 2001, 142). Harley and Rule (2003) and Swilling & Russell (2002, 59) confirm that 
foreign funding to NPOs decreased after 1994. (Although Swilling & Russell (ibid) and Kraak 
(2001, 135) indicate that by 1999 overseas development aid directly to NPOs was once again 
on the increase). Kraak (ibid, 137) notes:  
Donor priorities have changed and the patterns of funding may have shifted, to the 
disadvantage of some categories of NPOs. In particular Northern donors have 
sought to relocate resources to projects involved in the technical delivery of social 
services at the expense of research, project facilitation, human rights and lobbying 
and advocacy. There has also been a trend by donors and government agencies 
across the board to cut down on administration costs by making larger grants to a 
smaller number of organisations, and by entering into multi-year rather than 
annual funding contracts. This will inevitably have favoured larger, urban, more 
sophisticated NGOs to the detriment of smaller (quite often, innovative) projects.  
 
For NPOs to survive such changes and new development demands they needed to transform 
the way they operated radically, learn new skills and manage their resources differently.  
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Some of the NPOs that previously had an adversarial relationship with the state, struggled to 
reinterpret their role in post-apartheid South Africa (Atkinson 1996, 295). “Such organisations 
have been unprepared to enter a sustained, participatory relationship with government 
authorities” (ibid). Many NPOs were unable to adapt and as result were unable to attract 
sufficient funding. Experienced and skilled staff resigned from NPOs to take up posts in the 
new government or big business. Few skilled people were attracted to the relatively poorly 
paid jobs in the non-profit sector (Kraak 2001, 144-146). Some well-established NPOs in the 
field of development, for example the Urban Foundation and Learn and Teach, had to close 
because of the loss of expertise and lack of funds (Atkinson 1996, 295).   
 
1996 marked a major realignment of government’s macro development policy. The RDP was 
replaced by a neo-liberal programme called Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR). Nauta (2004, 16) calls this the start of the “new realism era”. One consequence of 
GEAR was the demise of the RDP Forums. Government began to pursue the much needed 
economic growth and service delivery (e.g. housing and electricity) by means of partnerships 
with the private sector, while NPOs retained their central role in poverty alleviation (Swilling 
& Russell 2002, 4; Motala & Husy 2001, 77-78). According Dr Skweyiya, who was the 
Minister of Social Development until May 2009, this is one of the roles the government 
envisaged NPOs playing. The second role is that of “social watch”, critical watchdogs of the 
state’s public policy priorities and practices. Commenting on the role of NGOs in post-
apartheid South Africa Dr Skweyiya said:  
The basic twin expectations of government are that NGOs will firstly, continue to 
act as monitors of the public good and safeguard the interests of the 
disadvantaged sections of society. This performance of social watch role requires 
both transparency and accountability on the part of NGOs. The government’s 
second expectation is that NGOs will assist in expanding access to social and 
economic services that create jobs and eradicate poverty among the poorest of the 
poor. This requires cost effective and sustainable service delivery. (Barnard & 
Terreblanche, 2001: 17)  
The government’s official position on NPOs was clarified with the passing of the Non-profit 
Organisations Act of 1997, which included them in the development process. Swilling & 
Russell (2002, 76) describe the NPOs’ new status as “…the fourth branch of a new system of 
participatory governance” because they were required to register as Section 21 organisations 
not-for-gain, and to open themselves to state regulation. Since 1998 NPOs have been able to 
access funding through the states’ National Development Agency (NDA) and the National 
Lottery, which was started in 1997 (ibid, 77-8). In 1998 the South African government 
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contributed 42% of the total funding received by the non-profit sector (ibid, 34). Furthermore, 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2000 exempts NPOs, which are registered by the 
Department of Social Development, from income tax and donors from donation tax (ibid, 78).  
 
Many professional NPOs work closely with the state for two reasons, primarily. They support 
cooperation with the state because they believe that partnering with a democratic government 
with whom they share development objectives is more effective than operating independently 
of the state. And they cannot survive without state funding. Collaborating with the state, 
therefore, seems sensible. With the help of state funding NPOs can work together with and 
provide services to poor communities at a grassroots level. The state has the funds but often 
lacks expertise in development, and does not have a close working relationship with poor and 
marginalised communities, which NPOs are more likely to have.  
 
Swilling and Russell (2002, 69) describe the current relationship between the state and non-
profit organisations (NPOs) in South Africa as following a “corporatist regime”. This regime 
is characterised by “extensive state expenditure on social development, but in partnership with 
segments of the non-profit sector. NPOs act as the conduits for delivering services, in place of 
or in partnership with state agencies” (ibid, 66).  
 
The current scenario potentially creates a public space in which state-civil society relations 
can be managed and the non-profit sector funded. But is there enough space in a corporatist 
regime for NPOs to be service deliverers and social watchdogs?  
 
According to Habib (2005), currently there is very little evidence of NPOs successfully 
combining both roles. Habib (2005: 686) argues that in reality three separate blocs have 
emerged in South African civil society, each with a distinctive relationship to the state. The 
first bloc includes more formal NGOs/NPOs that have benefited from the repeal of repressive 
apartheid legislation, and government’s commitment to partnering with them (ibid). This, he 
says, has led to engaged cooperation with the state (ibid). This type of NPO is characterised 
by their professionalism and their services are solicited by the government by means of 
contracts. Habib (2005, 686) says that it would seem that this collegial relationship between 
NGOs and the state is favoured by the ANC government. It is in the government’s view both 
legitimate and appropriate and the way they wish to interact with civil society, no matter the 
consequences for democracy. The second bloc includes the many survivalist, informal 
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community-based organisations (such as stockvels or savings clubs and burial societies) that 
help with the day-to-day existence of the poor (ibid). Generally speaking, this bloc is not 
connected to wider government processes, and has little or no relationship with the state. The 
third bloc are both nation-wide and local social movements, that rally people around issues 
such as land, housing, electricity, and anti-neoliberalism (ibid). They are more formally 
organised than the second bloc, and are committed to challenging the government’s policies 
and poor service delivery. They are free to oppose the state because they are not bound to it 
by contractual obligations, as the first category of NPOs is (ibid). 
 
In practice it seems that NPOs that engage with the state are divided into two camps: those 
that play the role of social watchdog and those that are apolitical deliverers of services. What 
arguments justify a significant number of NPOs performing both roles?  
 
4. Dual roles for NPOs  
Kaplan (1994) and Whaites (1998) argue that civil society is disadvantaged when NPOs focus 
exclusively on apolitical service delivery. Whaites (1998, 346-347) argues that development 
is promoted when NPOs partner with the state in order to deliver services, rather than doing 
so independently: firstly, because it gives NPOs an opportunity to draw the state into service 
delivery, and thereby build the state’s capacity; and secondly, it brings the state closer to poor 
or marginalised people, thereby increasing the latter’s opportunities to influence the state. The 
role of social watchdog need not be oppositional. In my experience a collegial approach is 
sometimes more effective than confrontation when dealing with government departments.  
 
Lister and Nyamugasira (2003, 100) also support the dual roles for NPOs, for advocacy needs 
to emerge from service delivery among the poor and marginalised (ibid). When NPOs are a 
bridge between the state and civil society, the likelihood that public policy can be influenced 
by those who were previously excluded increases (ibid).  
 
Desai (2002, 496) agrees that there are two main roles for NPOs: policy advocacy or lobbying 
for social change; and filling in the gaps in government service delivery. He argues that 
organisations can and should perform both.  
 
There are strong arguments for more NPOs to both collaborate and to perform the role of 
social watchdog. In addition, there are Dr Skweyiya’s comments that the ANC government 
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favours NPOs playing the dual roles. There seems to be good reason for “frienemies” to 
emerge from civil society, however, problems arise which undermine the NPOs’ ability to 
perform both roles effectively and in practice most find it easier to opt for one or the other 
role.  These problems can arise from external environmental factors or internal organisational 
factors.  
 
5. Obstacles to NPOs performing the dual roles 
5.1 Government discourages advocacy that clashes with its policy 
Greenstein (1998) argues that government’s acknowledgement that NPOs need to be both 
social watchdogs and service deliverers, is largely rhetoric, as it tends to discourage advocacy 
that clashes with its policies or priorities.  In 1997 at the national conference of the ANC in 
Mafikeng, ex-President Nelson Mandela openly rebuked NPOs that were critical of the 
government (Johnson 2002, 231). In 2004 in a “Letter from the President”, the then president, 
Thabo Mbeki referred to some NPOs as “enemies of the ANC” and warned that “history has 
never been kind to the enemies of his party” (Mngxitama 2004). Kotze (1999) offers this 
sobering thought: “we have to learn that all governments, however democratically elected [,] 
guard (and exercise) their newly-won power and that a vibrant and critical civil society is 
often, consciously or unconsciously, regarded as a threat to that power”.  The ruling party’s 
continued use of a simplistic, dichotomous discourse that labels NPOs as either friends or 
enemies does not nurture a political environment conducive to “frienemies” who speak truth 
to power while constructively working with the state to deliver services to the poor.  
 
5.2 “Productive engagement” encourages apolitical service delivery 
Aid agencies often talk about “productive engagement”: civil society is strengthened by 
“densifying” and formalising ties with the state, and that such close ties help Government 
implement its development plans (Heller and Ntlokonkulu 2001, 58). “In particular Northern 
donors have sought to relocate resources to projects involved in the technical delivery of 
social services at the expense of research, project facilitation, human rights and lobbying and 
advocacy” (Kraak 2001, 137).  However, “[t]he result may lead to the destructive co-option of 
NPOs [by the state], or the closure of the vital spaces beyond the public space … This is good 
for neither development nor democracy” (Swilling and Russell 2002, 77) because it leaves 
little room for the contestation of state power.  
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5.3 NPOs collaborating with the state are reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them   
Habib and Taylor (1999, 79) argue that as NPOs find it increasingly difficult to solicit foreign 
funding, they are becoming more dependent on the state for funds. Funding dependency 
subverts NPOs’ watchdog role; NPOs are more likely to be co-opted to serve Government 
priorities and ignore the most pressing needs of poor communities (Kotze 1999).  
 
5.4 NPOs are encouraged to become grand service providers, and, therefore, are too 
busy to pursue advocacy  
The negative consequences of the state and donors relying on NGOs as the primary deliverers 
of services are that … 
i.) It encourages them to become large scale primary service providers. Yet there is no 
empirical research which shows that NGOs are necessarily better service providers 
than the state (Edwards and Hume 1996). 
ii.) The enormous responsibility that this places on them can be at the expense of their 
role as social watchdog or advocate of the poor. 
iii.) It undermines their legitimacy as independent organs of civil society. 
iv.) It makes them accountable to donors first, rather than to their own constituencies. 
v.) It tends to pressure them to produce short-term quantitative outputs as evidence of 
their effectiveness, even when it contradicts development wisdom. 
 
5.5 NPOs do not have the capacity to carry out both roles 
For NPOs to practise both roles effectively they require the capacity to engage in planning 
discussions with the state and to be in close proximity to their grassroots beneficiaries (Lister 
and Nyamugasira 2003, 100). Large, professional NPOs have this capacity but they are not 
community-based (Swilling and Russell 2002, 81; Kaplan 1994). Grassroots organisations, 
close to poor communities, are relatively informally organised and, therefore, lack this 
capacity (ibid). 
 
5.6 Dangers for NPO-state relations in the current policy and legal framework.  
In the Non-profit Organisations Act of 1997 the Government and leading NPOs jointly 
created a legal and policy framework that defined a new public space for managing state-civil 
society relations, and for funding NPOs (Swilling and Russell 2002, 5). There are, however, 
two dangers, firstly, that in “defining all NPOs into the public space for governance processes 
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… no room is left for action outside this space” (ibid, 76-77). It does not promote 
development or democracy, for the state to block NPOs accessing spaces beyond this public 
space (ibid, 77). This would, for example, deny legitimacy to NPOs that, care for people 
infected HIV/AIDS, whose condition needs to be kept secret from those who would harm 
them (ibid). Secondly, the framework seems to draw NPOs into development projects in line 
with Government policy; NPOs that do not agree with policy are less likely to be given access 
to state resources. 
 
5.7 In national policy negotiations NPOs are not organised to adequately represent civil 
society.  
There have been attempts, at the national level, to include NPOs and other civil society 
organisations in policy-making structures. Act 35 of 1994 set up a corporatist structure, the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a policy negotiation forum 
with representatives from Government, trade unions, organised business and community 
organisations. There is no single national structure representing community organisations. 
Civil society is thus poorly represented on NEDLAC by six NPOs appointed by a government 
minister (NEDLAC 2009).  
 
While some organisations have managed the tension between their two roles, the odds are 
against most NPOs doing so. What can we learn from the successful organisations?  
 
6. “Frienemies”: examples of NPOs that effectively combine the two roles  
The Treatment Action Campaign and the Surplus People Project are NPOs that perform the 
dual roles of social watchdog and of service delivery partner with the state. I now turn to a 
brief examination of how these NPOs manage the dilemma inherent in carrying out these 
roles.  
 
6.1 The Treatment Action Campaign  
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) is a nation-wide NPO with features of a social movement 
and of an NGO. It was established on 10 December 1998, International Human Rights Day, to 
“campaign for greater access to treatment for all South Africans, by raising public awareness 
and understanding about issues surrounding …HIV treatments” and to “fight for the rights of 
people living with HIV/AIDS” (TAC 2009). It “campaign[s] for equitable access to affordable 
treatment for people with HIV/AIDS”, and for “the prevention and elimination of all new HIV 
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infections”; it also promotes “access to affordable and quality health-care for all people in 
South Africa” (TAC Constitution, 2-9). TAC is against any structure or process in the private 
or public sector that limits access to the treatment of HIV/AIDS (ibid). Consequently, it has 
lobbied and pressured the global pharmaceutical industry and the South African government 
to provide cheap, generic anti-Aids drugs (TAC 2009). 
 
Though TAC is probably better known for its role in securing concessions from the South 
African government, its founders started out targeting pharmaceutical companies (Friedman 
and Mottiar 2004). They got the companies to abandon their court case to stop the importation 
of the cheaper generic drugs
1
 (ibid).  
 
TAC did not anticipate that the government would deny the link between HIV and AIDS, and 
oppose the “roll out” of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs (ibid). TAC has made access to health 
care a constitutional issue. TAC’s position is that the Bill of Rights in the South African 
Constitution recognises health care as a basic human right. TAC’s application to the 
Constitutional Court saw the South African government ordered to implement a national 
programme to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV/AIDS (PMTCT).  
“The way our Constitution frames our government is that we all have roles and 
responsibilities in realising constitutional rights. The TAC’s approach to the 
delivery of health care services, and anti-retroviral treatment in particular, has 
always been premised on the idea that the government has a duty to provide these 
services.” (Heywood, Interview 2009) 
 
Heywood (Interview 2009) points out that “this is not just an ideological campaign, not an 
anti-government campaign … It is a campaign to ensure the best and meaningful delivery, in 
our case the right to access treatment.”  
 
TAC has used a variety of tactics with great success, lobbying through the media and via the 
internet; networking with South African and international civil society organisations; and, 
using street protests and mass action, tactics characteristic of the liberation struggle, to 
mobilise the masses (Robbins 2004, 664). Acts of civil disobedience, for example, importing 
medication in contravention of patent law, have also provided TAC with national and 
international visibility (ibid; Friedman and Mottiar 2004).  
 
TAC is also a service deliverer. TAC and Medicins Sans Frontières (MSF), a Belgian-based 
NGO, one of TAC’s most consistent international allies, have together established treatment 
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programmes in the urban centres of the Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces 
(TAC 2009); and, from 2003, in rural areas like Lusikisiki in the Eastern Cape Province (TAC 
2004, 8). Its treatment project provides medication for a limited number of TAC and 
“community” members, and for counsellors who undertake home visits. Its treatment literacy 
campaign offers advice, such as how to cope with HIV/AIDS and how to take or administer 
treatment (Friedman and Mottiar 2004; TAC 2007).   
 
TAC sees the treatment project and literacy campaign as demonstrating to government and the 
public, that TAC could be part of the “roll out” of treatment; thus linking the service delivery 
and campaigning (ibid). 
“There hasn’t been an internal contradiction … [between] service delivery versus 
activism. One of TAC’s biggest programmes, treatment literacy, is training 
volunteers to educate people in the community about anti-retroviral treatments, 
about HIV and about the progress of HIV. That could be said to be playing a 
service delivery role, but we saw that as something which empowered people in 
the community to be activists in making demands for local delivery of health care 
service. So it wasn’t either or as completely distinct things.” (Heywood, Interview 
2009) 
 
TAC activists argue that grassroots mobilisation to counter discrimination against HIV-
positive people, is the key to their success (Friedman and Mottiar 2004; Robbins 2005, 664). 
It takes the form of AIDS awareness and treatment literacy campaigns in schools, factories, 
community centres, churches, and shebeens (township pubs), and through door-to-door visits 
in townships (ibid).   
 
Grassroots mobilisation targets young, urban working-class black Africans with secondary 
schooling and trade unions (Friedman and Mottiar 2004; Robbins 2004, 663). The 
organisation also attracts health professionals, university students and has “support networks 
across race, class, ethnic, occupational and educational lines” (ibid). TAC’s 2007 Annual 
Report puts registered membership at 14000
2
, and estimates that public marches attracted as 
many as 15 000 protesters, an indication of its ability to rally more than its members (TAC 
2007).  
 
In 2007 TAC had 64 full-time staff and an annual income of 40 million rand (Annual Report 
2007); by 2009 it employed 98 permanent staff (Ajam 2009)
3
. Its staff size, administration, 
and donor-funded programmes are typical of a large NGO. It does not charge membership 
 14 
fees; its funds come from a variety of donors other than the South African government, 
pharmaceutical companies or the United States government (Heywood, Interview 2009). 
 
In addition to TAC’s well publicised opposition to the ANC government’s health care 
policies, it has also managed to work with the state on service delivery. TAC helped national 
government stop 39 pharmaceutical firms from overturning a law which allowed the 
importation of cheaper generic drugs, and it worked with government to draft a new National 
Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (TAC 2007).  TAC assists national government with the roll-out 
of ARVs, and co-operates with local government in providing counselling in South African 
schools. 
 
Heywood (Interview 2009) explains that TAC’s rationale for selective co-operation with the 
state is partly about demonstrating to the state and its membership that it is acting in good 
faith.  
“It is about bona fides in relation to both our membership and the state. Our 
membership regards the state as being legitimate – which of course it is – and 
wants to help the state where possible to deliver services. The TAC has also felt 
that in order to partly show its bona fides that you have to work alongside the 
state. You have to say [to a Minister] you should be doing ABC, but where 
possible and necessary we will provide assistance.”  
 
In spite of antagonistic relations between the national Department of Health and TAC during 
Thabo Mbeki’s presidency, Robbins (2004, 671-672) reports that “many provincial and local 
government health managers and public health practitioners look[ed] favourably upon 
partnerships with the TAC”.  One of my students has witnessed local government and NPOs, 
including TAC, respectfully and with equal power interacting within the Multi-Sectoral 
Action Team structure – in order to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  “TAC displays 
adversarial relations with the state on one issue and more collegiate [sic] relations on 
another… Indeed, TAC’s legal and political strategies reveal a clear understanding of the 
politics of contingency” (Habib 2005, 686). Relations between TAC and the government 
improved after the ANC removed Thabo Mbeki as the country’s president.  
“More recently the TAC has changed is strategy to take into account the new 
[favourable] political environment. TAC’s strategy is to ensure successful and 
sustained roll-out of HIV prevention and treatment service. That obviously 
includes TAC people becoming involved in working with the state in service 
delivery, in making sure the state’s clinics are functional.” (Heywood, Interview 
2009)  
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Though TAC is not affiliated to any political party it has ties with the ANC. ANC members 
are numerically dominant in TAC, and TAC leaders such as the chairperson, Zackie Achamat, 
have publicly indicated their support for the ruling party. The former treasurer, Mark 
Heywood, has said that TAC is “neither anti-government, nor anti-ANC” (Friedman and 
Mottiar 2004).  Allegiance to the ANC is probably why TAC has not adopted the anti-
government stance so common among social movements opposed to the government’s neo-
liberal policies. Friedman and Mottiar (ibid) observe that “the legitimacy of the government 
and the popularity of the ruling party are …new realities[,] which activists tackling 
government policy forget at their peril”.  In a similar vein Achmat (ibid) has said: “A major 
tactical error would be to lose support amongst our members, as other social movements have 
done, when they are seen to be threatening democratically elected leaders”. 
 
There is also a strategic reason for TAC’s approach in which co-operation and conflict are 
together used as methods of engagement, it is the assumption “we can win gains from this 
system – far-reaching reform is possible” (ibid). Now that the cabinet has agreed to an ARV 
“roll-out”, it is in TAC’s interests to assist government in making the roll-out a success. By 
publicly positioning themselves as supporters of the Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, 
South African Communist Party and COSATU, TAC activists have created a new space for 
critical engagement with the government; and like activists in COSATU, and even South 
African National Civics Organisation, they hold that the strategic priority is the struggle for 
the soul the ANC, so they remain in partnership with it (Habib 2005, 687). However, “at the 
same time, they believe they should retain the independence and organizational capacity to 
take to the streets when …required” (ibid). 
 
I now turn to a second example of an NPO perched on the horns of the dilemma. 
 
6.2 Surplus People Project 
The Surplus People Project (SPP) is one of the oldest NGOs in the Western Cape Province. It 
aims to support local small-scale farmers, farm dwellers and agrarian movements achieve 
sustainable livelihoods and independent food production through education, participatory 
research and social mobilisation (SPP 2008). In its Annual Report for 2000 SPP described its 
role:  
“[W]hile taking its cue from the landless communities with which it works, at the 
same time SPP works closely with government to implement land reform to 
benefit the landless communities. This means that SPP sometimes has to play a 
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dual role: as critic of the State where the State inhibits land reform progress, and 
contracted to the State to implement its programmes.” 
In the past few years its agenda has shifted from land reform to broader agrarian reform (SPP 
2007, 1, 7 and 23).  
 
SPP was established in 1985 as a result of a research project on forced removals (Turton and 
Komone 2004). It was a typical anti-apartheid NPO of the 1980s. It described itself as a 
progressive service organisation that helped people threatened with forced removals or 
eviction by informing them of their rights and providing legal assistance in court (SPP 1990). 
It was connected to the National Committee Against Removals, a wider coalition, that 
subsequently changed its name to the National Land Committee.  
 
With the coming of democracy SPP anticipated the need to transform. “In 1994 SPP shifted 
from resistance to concentrated intervention in land reform policy development” (SPP 2008). 
In 1995 the Department of Land Affairs began to transfer land to the historically 
disadvantaged, and to process the claims for restitution of those who had lost land under 
apartheid. SPP assisted the Department. Notwithstanding SPP’s collaboration with the new 
democratic government, it voiced concerns about the limitations imposed by the property 
clause in the Constitution and the government’s narrow focus on restitution rather than on 
comprehensive land reform (SPP 1994, 5). SPP insists that it retained a critical perspective 
during its involvement with the government’s land programme (ibid). It had “very close 
relationships [SPP had] with formal structures at grassroots level”, especially in rural 
Namaqualand along the Cape West Coast, which kept them close to the land struggles of 
small-scale farmers. “We spoke not only as SPP, we spoke almost as a representative of the 
Namaqualanders (and to a lesser extent the West Coast) although they had strong leaders 
themselves” (Mayson, Interview 2009). 
 
Between 1995 and 2000 the percentage of the SPP’s annual income that came from 
government kept increasing because the SPP received numerous government contracts.  For 
example, SPP received planning grants to help black farmers acquire private land (ibid).  In 
1998 30% of its income came from government, however, for 2001, 2002 and 2003 it was 
around 10% (SPP 2001, 2002, 2003). SPP seemed to appreciate that its capacity to be critical 
of the state while co-operating with it was enhanced by it avoiding financial dependence on 
the state. Those annual reports which provide a detailed breakdown of donors show that SPP 
received support from a mix of South African and foreign donors. Mayson (Interview 2009) 
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notes that SPP was wary of becoming dependent on the state as this could jeopardise its role 
as social watchdog.   
 
SPP was convinced that by co-operating in order to improve service delivery to poor farmers 
and also lobbying for change in the government’s policies, it could better serve the 
communities with which it worked.  
“SPP took its line from the community… [sometimes] co-operation and 
[sometimes] social watch. SPP was driven by a pragmatism: What do 
communities need to do to get what they need? … SPP facilitated dialogue 
between government and small farmers that put these farmers in a good position 
to get a stronger voice in government. It also supported grassroots community 
organisations to lobby government. [While] it was a challenge to perform both 
roles …from 1995-1999 it was able to perform both roles well.” (ibid) 
 
Between 1999 and 2000 there were changes in the Department of Land Affairs. There was a 
new minister who declared a moratorium on all land projects until an assessment had been 
completed (SPP 2000). Under new leadership the Department chose to rely on specialists to 
guide policy while excluding communities and civil society structures. This confounded rural 
communities, who were waiting for decisions on land projects, and the NGOs, that were 
working with government. With the uncertainty about the new policies, SPP began to question 
collaborating with government. “The question to what extent the organisation can continue to 
be supportive of a government that appears to have shifted its priorities to a new elite was 
asked many times during 2000” (ibid).  
 
Their dilemma was magnified because foreign donors showed less interest in the relatively 
wealthy Western Cape and payment for completed government contracts was delayed (SPP 
2000). Furthermore, “there was ... division within the National Land Committee.  Some, like 
the Landless People’s Movement … argued for no relationship with the state” (ibid). This 
crisis led to a major re-assessment of SPP’s position vis-à-vis the state (ibid). Faced with 
options to mobilise against state land policies or collaborate with the state, the SPP once again 
chose both roles (ibid).  
 
From the beginning of the new millennium the oscillation between co-operation and social 
watch is evident in SPP’s annual reports. The 2000 Report noted that their diminishing ability 
to persuade government to return to the consultative policy-making reflected a general 
weakening of civil society. Mayson subsequently (SSP 2002, 20) summed up their position.  
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“Ten years ago we had a collaborative approach to government ... because the 
government was new, our policy intervention work was more constructive. We 
were trying to construct new ways of doing things. … Now government talks in 
terms of public consultation but is in fact severely threatened by it. This requires 
our being more creative on one level, and more pushy on another.” 
 
Notwithstanding SPP’s success in conscientising and mobilising rural communities, they 
“struggled to play a real role in land reform and its implementation” (Mayson, Interview 
2009). In the 2002 Annual Report, the then director commented that social movements were 
taking the struggle forward by challenging government’s market-based, elitist position on 
land reform. After the National Land Commission was dissolved, the SPP was well placed in 
relation to both poor farming communities and the state to “fill the void in civil society [and] 
to push for specific land reform objectives” (ibid).  
 
SPP’s role as a social watchdog continues to be balanced by a collegial discourse. Although 
there are some critical comments about the government’s small land reform budget and land 
restitution programme. Their 2001 Annual Report, for example, expresses gratitude to 
government for a grant to carry out the “Transformation of Tenure in Namaqualand”. The 
report also reaffirms SPP’s commitment to partner with various government departments and 
all stakeholders in land reform. However, staff members are mindful of the risks of co-
operating with the state. “Our dual role of participating while maintaining our position as 
activists is sometimes quite difficult. The risk is that communities perceive us as the [state] 
Department, which diminishes our ability to be activists” (SPP 2002).  
 
Despite the frustratingly slow pace of land reform, SPP has helped a number of historically 
disadvantaged communities to secure hundreds of thousands of hectares of land (Turton and 
Komone 2004, 39). Through its affiliation to the National Land Committee it helped launch 
the Landless People’s Movement, a mass-based social movement. “The role of SPP has 
therefore become an initiator of lobbying activities; a facilitator of lobbying activities initiated 
elsewhere (especially amongst landless people’s groups with whom the organisation works), 
and supporter of lobbying activities undertaken by others” (SPP 2007, 26-27). 
 
Turton and Komone (2004, 10) recognise how difficult it is for SPP to combine activism and 
delivery. Mayson in a 2009 interview elaborates on the nature of the difficulty. 
“Implementation needs a different skills set and advocacy needs you to put an enormous 
amount of effort into organising people …[I]t is easier to do this if you have a clear enemy.” 
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SPP’s ability to survive is partly due to its organisational maturity. As a “learning 
organisation” it “pays particular attention to developing the staff and in developing itself” 
(Turton and Komone 2004, 41). 
 
It seems that for the moment SPP is able to hold the roles in balance.  
 
6.3 Features of TAC and SPP that support their dual roles  
While it might be easier for the TAC and SPP to be friends or enemies of the ANC 
government they have chosen a more complex relationship – one I describe as “frienemies” of 
the ANC government. They have managed the difficult feat of balancing the tension between 
collaborating with the state in service delivery while acting as social watchdogs. They share a 
number of common features which seem to have helped them do this: 
i) They are concerned with winning gains for the poor rather than acting only as vehicles 
of protest or resistance.  
ii) Their vision and mission include both service delivery and social watch which, among 
other things, involves making sure that concessions won by campaigns translate into 
concrete gains. 
iii) Their advocacy and lobbying for better social policies are informed by their experience 
delivering services and the politics of the moral high ground.  
iv) They have diversified their sources of local and foreign funding so that they do not 
depend on any one funding agency.  
v) They have built an effective power base of strategic alliances that always works with, 
and is guided by people and communities at grassroots. This provides them with a 
collective advantage when dealing with the ANC government. 
vi) They use various strategies to achieve their objectives. These include challenging 
unacceptable state policies, mass social mobilisation, and selective co-operation with 
government. 
vii) As long as they rely on government delivery to achieve their goals; they and the ANC 
government will remain, to a degree, mutually dependant, whatever the degree of 
conflict between them.  
viii) They acknowledge diversity within government and seek to collaborate where possible 
so as to build capacity within the civil service, and yet will still challenge those in 
government who do not serve the interests of the poor.  
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ix) They are organisationally strong with a confident, articulate collective leadership that is 
not afraid to challenge public policies and practices. 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
There are good arguments for “frienemies” to perform the roles of social watchdog critical of 
the state and service deliverer in collaboration with the state, but problems arise which 
undermine their ability to perform both roles effectively. These problems arise from external 
environmental factors or internal organisational factors. Chief among these is the current 
political climate (which started when Thabo Mbeki was president): there does not appear to 
be sufficient courage and tolerance to allow “frienemies” to walk the tightrope between 
collaborating in service delivery and social activism. Consequently, NPOs tend to opt for one 
role over the other because they reason that they are more likely to survive as friends or 
enemies of the ANC government, and not as “frienemies”. Notwithstanding these tendencies 
in civil society organisations relations with the state, I argue that where NPOs perform both 
roles development and the interests of poor and marginalised communities are best served.  
 
I am not suggesting that all NPOs ought to perform both roles, for that would deny the 
benefits that diversity among organs of civil society can bring, but I do draw attention to the 
advantages for development of more South African NPOs performing both these roles.  
 
Post-apartheid South Africa has presented NPOs with new political opportunities. 
Democratisation, by removing the threat of state repression from some types of protest action, 
has provided opportunities for NPOs to influence change and make gains for the poor, for 
example the use of the Constitutional Court or engagement with government. Were the ANC 
government to diminish its corporatist role and encourage greater independence for civil 
society organisations, the political climate would change significantly and more NPOs would 
consider becoming “frienemies” of the state. TAC and SPP’s experiences can teach civil 
society organisations how to win battles as “frienemies” of the ANC government. NPOs that 
are committed to both service delivery and social watch can learn from TAC and SPP how to 
build their organisational capacity so as to successfully hold the tension in performing both 
roles. 
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Of course, it remains to be seen whether their approach can win the sort of sustained policy 
changes and social programmes which will enable the poor and the marginalised in South 
Africa to claim their full status as citizens. 
 
End Notes  
1. In 2001, after a three-year struggle between national government and TAC, on the one 
hand, and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 39 pharmaceutical 
companies, on the other, the pharmaceutical industry withdrew its case against the South 
African government.  They had wanted to prevent the government from substituting 
cheaper generic drugs for the costly patented brand-named medicines. 
2. TAC acknowledges that their records may not be accurate due to the mortality rate of its 
members (Friedman and Mottiar 2004). 
3. From about 2008 TAC experienced a substantial shortfall in expected income which, 
according to the general secretary, Vuyiseka Dubula, resulted in the retrenchment of 20% 
of its staff (The Citizen November 2008). The drop was partly due to the Department of 
Health’s  long delay in  handing over funds donated by the Global Fund for the TAC; and 
donors cutting back on funding due to the recent global financial crisis (ibid; Ajam 2009). 
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